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Abstract 
Regarding Southeast Asia as a multi-ethnic region, this paper attempts to examine 
about why Buddhist Community turns into religious violence against Rohingya 
people in the State of Rakhine (formerly known as Arakan). Through understanding 
the triggers of conflicts, this paper applies historical perspective to analyze why 
ethnic-religious conflict occur nowadays between Buddhist and Rohingya Muslim in 
Myanmar. This paper also discusses how history has influenced the construction of 
the government’s policy under a military regime to exclude Rohingya. However, the 
ethno-religious conflict is either an indication of a weak state or failure state in 
managing diversity. 
Key words: ethnic-religion violence, Muslim Rohingya, Buddhist Rakhine, state’s 
role 
 
Introduction 
The challenges that newly 
independent state faces in the post-colonial 
period are not only on how to manage 
diversity but also how to maintain the 
stability of a nation-state based on 
nationalism. Southeast Asia is the 
portrayal of the “melting pot” with its 
mixed ethnic identity and religious 
diversity among them. It is the place where 
most of its unification is an agreement 
resulting after the colonial states left at the 
end of World War II. Meanwhile, the 
mixed community has also caused another 
problem, which revolves around minority 
and majority. Rather than examining the 
problem of diversity, this paper will focus 
on explaining why the Rohingya Muslim 
and Rakhine Buddhist often involve in 
these conflicts compared to other ethnic 
groups in Myanmar throughout its 
historical perspective.  
Throughout history, the conflict 
between Rohingya Muslim in the north 
and Rakhine Buddhist in the South of 
Rakhine state are much influenced by their 
relationship in the past. Although it is 
classic, the history has created a pattern of 
a conflict which is accumulated in the 
society and has constructed their 
perspectives about the others. Moreover, 
this can also be used to analyze why the 
government leads the primordialist issue 
as a reason to maintain stability within the 
state. Thus, history is one main factor to 
construct the ethnic-religious conflict in 
Myanmar today. Even though, Aung San 
Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy 
(NLD) won the elections in 2015 and her 
victory is a way to democracy, but in the 
case of the Rohingya, the task will not be 
easy. 
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Rohingya Muslim in the Land of 
Pagodas 
Many centuries ago, Hinduism is 
the most dominant religion in the Rakhine 
Kingdom and Buddhism took its place in 
the 500 BCE. After around 710 CE, Islam 
reached the state (Saw, 2011; Sakinada, 
2005). According to Minahan (2012) in the 
book entitled Ethnic Groups of South Asia 
and the Pacific: An Encyclopedia, Islam’s 
arrival has embraced many of the former 
Buddhist, Hindu, and animist population. 
When Bengal was under Muslim rule in 
1213, Muslim’s influence was greatly 
developed in Arakan (Minahan, 2012) one 
the other hand, Bamars or Burmans 
disposed the king of Arakan in 1404. 
During the same period, Buddhism 
became the most influential and 
ascertained religion which can be seen in 
the later period of Rakhine kings who were 
all Buddhists (Gibson, James, & Falvey, 
2016). Another fact of Rakhine State is that 
for many centuries there has been relations 
made between the Muslims in Bengal and 
the Kingdom of Arakan. When Arakan was 
independent in the 15th and 16th century, 
this region was ruled by both Buddhists 
and Muslims (Ursula, 2014). 
According to Minahan (2012), 
Rohingya was also known as Ruainggas, 
that is part of Indo-Aryan ethnic group. He 
stated that there are other Rohingya 
communities spreading out in Saudi 
Arabia, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Europe, North America, United Arab 
Emirates, Australia, and New Zealand. 
That is approximately 3.5 million of 
Rohingya people and about 800,000 has 
lived in the Rakhine State (Minahan, 2012). 
He also explained that Rohingya speaks an 
Indo-Aryan language which refers to 
Bengali or known as Chittagonian 
language that Southeastern Bangladesh 
uses and in the religion aspect, most of 
Rohingya has Muslims- Sunni. In his book, 
Minahan also stated that according to 
Bamar Historian “…the term ‘Rohingya’ did 
not appear until the 1950s when it was coined 
by Bengali Muslim migrants who had settled in 
the Rakhine region during the colonial 
period…” (Minahan, 2012). On the contrary, 
another literature claims that the Rohingya 
community has settled in that region for a 
long period before it was under the British 
colonial rule. 
The historical background of 
Arakan seems close to the conflict. In 1785, 
Burman soldiers have attacked Arakan 
brutally resulting to the destruction of 
mosques, libraries, and cultural 
institutions (Jonassohn & Björnson, 1998). 
The Burman monarchy attempts to clean 
up those who were considered as “the 
other” or has non-Burmese origins. In the 
efforts to appall the memories of Burmese 
brutality, the Rohingya community 
welcomed the British in Arakan and it was 
during the colonial rule that they received 
political rights and economic autonomy. In 
1937, the British separated Arakan from the 
Indian empire which causes the Rohingya 
community’s regress into its previous 
situation; living in fear and insecurity. 
In 1942, the Japanese forces have 
reached Rakhine and made that area as a 
front line until the end of the Second World 
War. During 1942-43, both Muslims and 
Rakhines were attacking each other mostly 
due to their different alliances; most 
Muslim communities were pro-British, and 
Rakhines were supporting the Japanese. 
With shellacking from both parties, 
Muslim communities fled to the north 
where they were a majority, and Rakhine 
moved to the south (Yegar, 1972, in Asia 
Report No. 26, International Crisis Group 
(ICG), 2014). This is reasonable in seeing 
why the largest Muslim groups were 
settled in the Rakhine State. In 1945, British 
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awarded the Rohingya community a 
civilian administration in Arakan because 
of their loyalty. Two years later in 1948, 
Arakan State was integrated into Burma 
according to the 1948 treaty and Burma 
granted its independence from Britain 
(Jonassohn & Björnson, 1998). 
Although many evidences and 
historical reports prove that the Rohingya 
community is a native in that region, but 
Burma (now Myanmar) as well as the 
Burmese Kingdom still perceived them as 
foreigners or newcomers. Therefore, for 
the Muslims living as a minority in the 
Buddhists’ land is difficult for Rohingya. 
The poor relationship between Muslims 
and Buddhists did not only happens today, 
but it has a heavy historical relation that 
result to the Burmese’s reluctance to co-
exist with the Rohingya Muslims since 
centuries ago. 
Today the Rakhine State, like other 
states of Myanmar, is a diverse region. The 
Rakhine Buddhist is the largest group 
amongst the total population which is 
approximately 60 per cent of the 3.2 
million. The Muslim communities, 
including Rohingya, are at least 30 per cent 
while the rest population is Chin (who are 
Buddhist, Christian or Animist), and other 
small minorities including the Kaman (also 
Muslim), Mro, Khami, Dainet and 
Maramagyi who have reached 10 per cent 
(International Crisis Group (ICG), 2014). In 
fact, the data of Rohingya population could 
not be accurately mentioned; it is because 
there are discrepancies of numbers from 
different sources. 
Moreover, there are communities 
unregistered as citizens because they are 
unrecognized by the regime under the 1982 
Citizenship Law. The military regime 
rejects Arakan Muslims (Rohingya) from 
their recognition as citizens, even though 
they have been settling in the land of 
Arakan since 1823 (Bayefsky, 2005). The 
Rohingya community was not only 
stateless but also endures military 
pressure; including highly restrictive 
policies. This situation is compounded by 
the fact that the military regime is the one 
to facilitate the movement against 
Rohingya (Dittmer, 2010). The goal of that 
movement is to reduce Rohingya’s 
population, hence, there is no accurate 
documentation estimating the number of 
Muslim population in the Rakhine State. 
Meanwhile in 1982, there was about 56 per 
cent of the total population inhabitant in 
the district (Yegar, 2002). It is possible that 
the Rohingya community has the highest 
population at that time. A decade later in 
1994, Burmese Muslim was estimated to be 
3 per cent out of the total population of 45 
million, but Muslim claimed that their 
number of population is around 7 million 
or 13 per cent out of the total population 
(Veen, 2005). According to the data, the 
Muslim population shows a small number 
in Myanmar, but the data of ICG in 2014 or 
other sources stated that Rohingya 
Muslims were the second largest group in 
the State of Rakhine; even though the 
number was under 50 per cent of the 
population. However, this imbalance 
number of population causes insecurity 
and fear to emerge. 
Violence Against Rohingya: Problem 
with Ethnicity or Religiosity? 
The violence against minority 
refers to “uncertainty” (Appadurai, 2006). 
The problem “came out” when they are 
among us and the boundaries are unclear 
between “them” and “us.” Likewise, the 
minority group who has identified 
themselves as different, the majority needs 
them to determine what they call as “we.” 
According to Appadurai (2006), the 
majority needs the “other” to define their 
own identity. He also argues that the 
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majority recognizes the minority group as 
an “impure” element in the national body. 
Meaning, they destroy an opportunity for 
self-definition in “understanding their 
own identity” (Sen, 2010). 
In fact, the concept of “we” as the 
majority’s argument poses as a difficult 
boundary to accept the “others.” In the case 
of Rohingya, the Burma Kingdom for 
many centuries ago and Myanmar state 
today have continuously oppressed them 
because they are different. They are 
regarded as not a part of Myanmar 
nationality. Rohingya is perceived as 
different because they were pro-British in 
the Second World War and they have a 
different religious identity with the 
majorities of Myanmar. Rohingya was 
closely associated with Bengali, but on 
contrary, they are clearly different from 
Bengali; physically and politically. 
When it is believed in 1990 that in 
accordance with the ending of Cold War, 
the world would return to a new hope of 
peacefulness and a more democratic world 
order, but the fact is showing the 
pathologies in the nationhood purification. 
Myanmar, since their political isolationism 
under the military’s rule in 1962, is closed 
from outside world. There is not much 
information acknowledged by the 
international community regarding 
Myanmar’s situation. There is no clear and 
obvious information on how Rohingya 
people becomes the object of perpetrator 
and the subject to brutal violence from the 
majorities. For example, in 1991-2, the 
army has arranged about 250,000 Rohingya 
communities to flee to Bangladesh, and 
they were repatriated without “given 
citizenship” by the state (Dittmer, 2010). 
In addition, the data reported by 
Rianne ten Veen and the Islamic Human 
Rights Commission states that in 1991, 
Rohingya Muslims were targeted as object 
of abuse. While, the data has also shown 
that in 1994, at least 110,000 Karen and 
Mon people (some of Myanmar’s 
ethnicities) as other minority groups in 
Myanmar fled to Thailand during the 
intense offensive act by the military of 
Rakhine (Burma Project, n.d.). Muslim 
Rohingya might not be the only minority 
group that is targeted in the violence. 
However, compared to the other groups, 
the issue of Rohingya Muslims is more 
complicated. 
Meanwhile, according to the 2009 
Human Right Watch Report, in 1995, the 
Bangladesh government has forced most of 
Rohingya Muslims to go back to the border 
with the UN supporting this repatriation 
process. Then, the government granted 
them a Temporary Registration Card 
(TRC), which gave them the limited 
freedom of movement and employment in 
the western part of Arakan. 
The violence for anti-Muslim also 
occurred in 1996 in Shan state and Yangon. 
In 1997, SLORC initiated an anti-Muslim 
riot in Mandalay as well as other cities and 
the government is reported to be involved 
in the riot (Veen, 2005). The issue of anti-
Muslim violence has since been happening 
in 2001 as well as in Sitwe which results to 
many Muslims and Buddhists killed and 
injured. Since that time, the Government 
decided for travel restriction on Muslims in 
the conflict area, particularly those who do 
travel between Sitwe and other towns. In 
these cases, there were no information on 
whether Muslim-Rohingya has been 
involved in the conflict or not. However, 
the issue of anti-Muslim (non-Rohingya) 
has also spreads out to the other Muslim 
communities. The data from Amnesty 
International reported that Karen Muslim 
community has also been victimized. A 
refugee from Muslim Karen Woman from 
Hpa’an Township Kayen State, said that 
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her village was destroyed by the soldiers in 
April 2004 - including their mosque. 
Until in 2012, the conflict occurred 
between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya 
Muslims in Rakhine finally spreads out in 
international media, harvesting mass 
attention from the world. The trigger of 
this conflict is the rape and murder of a 
Buddhist woman by Rohingya Muslims 
which leads into violence and riot in the 
same year. The data report shows that 
dozens of people were killed, a hundred 
houses burned, and 75,000 people, mostly 
Rohingya, displaced (Caballero-Anthony, 
2016). 
The conflict between Muslim 
Rohingya and Buddhist Rakhine also 
spreads out of the Rakhine state. In March 
2013, violence occurred in Meiktila, 
Mandalay region and 43 people were killed 
in this accidence. While in May 2013, a 
boarding school and a mosque were set on 
fire in Lashio, Shan State (Fuller, 2013). 
According to the data, extremist Buddhist 
groups known as 969 were suspected to 
initiate the anti-Muslim violence. This 
report is also written by Caballero (2016), 
but according to her, 40 people were killed 
because of these riots. She explained that a 
commotion in a gold shop in Meiktila, 
Central Myanmar has lead the violence 
between Buddhist and Muslims. 
She also explicated that based on 
the UN claim and a BBC News report, in 
January 2014, more than 40 Rohingya men, 
women, and children were killed in 
Rakhine State after an issue that a 
Rohingya Muslim killed a Rakhine police. 
Seeing these cases, we can see how 
violence can be easily followed by another 
violence; even the reason behind the 
incident was unclear. The boundaries of 
conflict become unclear then, whether it is 
communal conflict between Rohingya and 
Rakhine or Rohingya Muslims and 
Rakhine Buddhists. Besides being Muslim, 
the physical appearance of Rohingya is 
very distinct from the descendant of 
Mongoloid. It seems to simplify the reason, 
“they are not like us; we cannot accept 
them” (Hurd, 2015). 
The communal violence between 
Muslim Rohingya and Buddhist Rakhine 
was not only an issue in the Islamic world, 
but also in international level. It leads into 
strong international critic over military 
government of Myanmar neglecting the 
conflict in Rakhine state. However, the 
violence against Rohingya Muslim by the 
state is showing how state has significant 
rule in perceiving Rohingya as “the other.” 
Thus, the discrimination was not only in, 
law, economic, or education, but also 
political and humanity right. 
When Buddhists Turn to Violence 
The historical explanation 
describes that Arakan State, for centuries, 
has been an area for territory struggle and 
symbol of power, respectively amongst 
Portugal, Britain and Japanese. The 
Rakhine Buddhist and Muslim, including 
Rohingya are claiming each other that 
Arakan is their own land, whether that is 
“the land of Muslims” or “the land of 
Buddhists.” In terms of political 
phenomenon, there are two major factors 
in ethno-religious conflicts which are 
ethnicity and territory (Harris, 2009). 
In her book, Erika Harris (2009) 
explained that homeland is a crucial place 
for the people: 
“In the case of homeland, the appeal is 
that, in the first place, it belongs to 
people whose name it carries; what 
happens to others who may not have 
another homeland or who even think of 
it as their own is as secondary 
consideration, if a consideration of 
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ethno-national movements at all… 
there is no potential for conflict 
anywhere without disputed territory, 
as there is no peace without territorial 
settlements. Homelands are spaces 
where national narratives are made, to 
which past struggles and dreams of the 
future belong. All homeland are “lands 
of hope and glory” but also, space of the 
nightmare of ethnic violence take 
place….” 
Nevertheless, the conflict in 
Rakhine state is not only about the clash of 
two ethnicities, but also identity, which 
Harris did not include it as an element of 
analysis. The identity could not be 
separated from homeland nor ethnicity. It 
can be seen from the Palestine conflict 
between Palestinian and Israeli who fights 
and claims that Palestine is their homeland. 
For Rohingya people or the Rakhine 
Buddhist, Rakhine state is the place where 
their ancestor lived in and they are 
emotionally engaged with. Arakan is the 
place where they find the memories of their 
identity. Although the oppressed 
government compels them to leave the 
land, they are returning with the 
consequence of being stateless.  It is 
because they have no other place nor 
choice for both to stay and survive. 
Historical homeland conflict also 
has its root when U Nu regime fulfilled 
their promise to give autonomy in Arakan 
and Mon in 1962. However, the Mujahidin 
in that time continue demanding its legal 
separation from Burma (Azizah in Yusuf, 
2013). In the same year also, Burmese 
Army did coup d’état against U Nu regime, 
and Burma was under military junta. In 
1989, the government changed the name of 
Arakan to Rakhine. Thus, when someone 
mentions “Arakanese Muslims,” it refers to 
Muslim minorities that has already 
disappeared.  It seems that the 
nomenclature of Rakhine was designed for 
Rakhine people or known as “the Buddhist 
land.” 
There are three core points 
contesting in this conflict; ethnicity, 
territory, and identity, which are all related 
to the historical background.  These points 
are the main elements of why conflict 
happens in the world, particularly in 
Rakhine. According to Jack Snyder (2000), 
there are two kinds of nationalities in the 
world: ethnic nationalism and civic 
nationalism. Ethnic nationalism is based on 
the primordial sentiments such as 
ethnicity, culture, or religion. While, civic 
nationalism is based on national 
sentiments that overcome the distinction of 
ethnicity, religion, race, and social class 
within the society. Today, in the 
globalization era, the ethnic nationalism, 
which based on primordialism sentiment is 
being abandoned gradually, especially in 
the West.  In contrary, the countries that 
faced diversity problems like Myanmar, 
the common structure of a conflict is 
constructed by the dominant power to 
marginalize the minorities with great 
oppression. 
The question then is why the 
Buddhist community turns to violent 
measures against Rohingya Muslims. 
Firstly, it should be noted that religious 
violence can occur in all religions 
(Hansclever & Rittberger, 2000; Seul, 1999; 
Bartels, n.d.). Jeffrey Seul in his journal 
argued that the escalation of intergroup or 
inter-ethnicity conflict cannot be solely 
seen as identity competition, even 
economic and politics factors also play 
important roles in the conflict (Seul, 1999).  
By adopting Connor’s idea about 
nationalism which refers to “us-them” 
(Seul, 1999), Seul explains that Connor’s 
argument was based on a single cultural 
marker, including religion which can be 
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the root or reference for national identity 
construction. This argument could be 
examined in the context of Myanmar in 
which Buddhism was constructed as their 
national identity. In the other hand, 
Rohingya community is not reflected as a 
part of the Mongolian nation. Thus, there 
must be a logical argument to explain how 
intergroup conflicts in Rakhine occur. 
Seul as well as Samuel Huntington 
are using the primordialist perspective. 
Huntington believes that the next pattern 
of conflict after the Cold War pattern was 
not only dominated by ideological or 
economical aspects, but it will involve 
religion-fed cultural “fault lines” (Ventura, 
2014).  The following statement is 
Huntington’s most cited passage in The 
Clash of Civilization: 
“It is my hypothesis that the 
fundamental source of conflict in this 
new world will not be primarily 
ideological or primarily economic. The 
great divisions among humankind and 
the dominating source of conflict will 
be culture” (Huntington, 1993). 
According to the primordialists 
(Samuel Huntington, Gilles Kepel, Jeffrey 
Seul, and Bassam Tibi), they argue that the 
most important factor in the twenty-first 
century conflicts is the nations in 
civilization (Hasenclever & Rittberger, 
2000). In their book, Hasenclever and 
Rittberger are also attempting to outline 
the three approaches to analyze the impact 
of faith and politics, before it can be used to 
measure the conflict. 
In the instrumentalist perspective, 
socio-economic are the basic of conflict and 
religion is only a spurious correlation in 
terms of intergroup conflict. The 
Instrumentalists believe that most of 
religious conflicts start from unequal 
growth between economic, social, political 
and nations (Hasenclever & Rittberger, 
2000). Otherwise, in the constructivist 
perspective, religion is an intervening 
variable. 
Marco Ventura (2014) mentions 
about the constructivist approach in his 
book in the following term: 
“…ethnic identity is as fluid, 
changeable, and often actively 
contested. From such perspective, most 
of the emphasis of the analysis is on the 
strategic aim of collectivity framing 
ethnic membership and boundaries in a 
given manner than on individual 
motives to endorse a given ethnic 
affiliation. Consequently, elite and 
mass interests are not assumed to 
converge, nor are the interests of 
different ethnic group assumed to be 
intrinsically divergent: ethnic conflict 
and violence can serve elite interests 
beyond ethnic boundaries and can 
contradict the interests of the masses 
on all sides.” 
This approach also described about 
how the elite plays a significant role in 
intergroup conflicts. Related to the 
Rohingya case, the elite Army plays a role 
to mobilize the violence through 
recognizing that Rohingya people are the 
“impure” community in the state. Here, 
the regime saw the issue of impurity as an 
opportunity to reduce population. Indeed, 
Buddhist-Muslim violence is nothing new 
in Myanmar, especially in Rakhine 
(Kingsbury, 2015). It can be seen from the 
government statement when other entities 
ask of the solution for refugee camps or 
deportation. President Thein Sein 
emphasizes that Rohingya people were 
unacceptable in Myanmar. His comments 
in Radio Free Asia (2013), states that they 
take responsibility for their own ethnics 
and because Rohingya were not 
authentically their ethnic, it was 
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impossible to endure them legally 
(Caballero-Anthony, 2015). 
There are two approaches to 
understand the Buddhist in how they are 
involved in the violence; that are 
primordialists and constructivist 
perspective. But this hypothesis has also 
been influenced from the history of 
relationships between Buddhist and 
Rohingya just as how Burmese-Buddha 
has ruled for centuries imposing the 
Rohingya. Aside from the historical 
background, cultural reasons also play an 
important role. If cultural reasons cause the 
construction of “us and them,” which is 
very clear to differentiate Rohingya 
Muslim and Rakhine Buddhist, then it is 
indeed an important factor that depicts and 
influences the course of history for 
Rohingya people in Myanmar 
continuously. 
The Buddhist practices its religion 
as a Burmese religion for centuries so that 
it has a strong influence in the Burmese 
culture. Although the government 
changed the name of Burma into 
Myanmar, the identity was already 
embraced by the whole nation. Since there 
is an imbalance between majority and 
minority, the Buddhist culture becomes a 
reflection of their basic culture. They feel 
insecure and fearful that the minority will 
change the Buddhist culture. 
On the other hand, according to the 
historical background in during the British 
colonial, Rohingya Muslims owns legal 
administration since they were loyal to the 
British colony. They have an opportunity 
in economic, social status, and education. 
They have a position in the government 
and this continues in the U Nu regime until 
coup d’état by the junta military in 1962. 
Historically, they came to Arakan as 
traders and soldiers, most are notably from 
Arab, Mongol, Turkish, Portuguese, and 
Bengali. When Arakan was Bengal’s 
feudatory in the 15th century, Rohingya 
converted to Islam and developed their 
own distinct culture and art (Jonassohn & 
Björnson, 1998). The Rohingya community 
has the skills needed to develop their own 
economic ability or thorough education 
but because they are “stateless,” they do 
not have the opportunity and are 
powerless. On the other hand, the Rakhine 
Buddhist already has an opportunity to 
restore their socio-economic because they 
have obtained official citizenship.  
However, when Rakhine Buddhists opted 
violence, it seems that they are defending 
their nationalism, but unfortunately 
Rohingya could not do the same way, 
because they have either no state or 
“nationalism.” 
An Overview: Islam in Myanmar 
Muslim in Myanmar was not 
dominated by the ethnic of Rohingya, there 
some ethnics involved as well. However, 
the antagonistic relationship between 
Rohingya Muslim and Buddhist Rakhine 
has never been in peace. Serial conflicts 
record that ethnical conflict between 
Burmese with Buddhists as a majority and 
other immigrant, such as Indians, does 
happen. Sub-ethnics such as Mon and 
Karen, as mentioned previously, have also 
become victims in the Burmese conflict, 
and many among of them are Muslims. 
It is significant since Buddhists in 
Myanmar has not been in the conflict with 
other Muslim community with Chinese 
descendant –Chinese Muslim that comes 
from Yunan, a border area between China 
and Myanmar in the west. Most of them 
come to Burma as traders, breeders and 
refugees in the post-Panthay revolution 
(1856-1873). Under the Manchu 
government in Myanmar, this Chinese 
Muslims then are well-known as Panthay 
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or Hui in the Chinese language. According 
to Naw Lily Kadoe in her writing entitled 
Ulama, State, and Politics in Myanmar, as 
cited in Yegar (1972), this tribe easily 
assimilates with the local community and 
is be able to keep their identity as Muslims. 
On the other hand, the arrival of 
Indians under the British government had 
caused an increasing number of Muslim 
population in Myanmar. Previously, the 
Muslim population in this state is small, 
passive and loyal to the king of Burma.  
Yet, the coming of Indian immigrants have 
doubled the population and with the 
increasing number of mosque and school 
based on Islamic education constructions 
(Yegar, 1972). The scale of ethnical conflict 
between Indian Muslims and Burmese 
Buddhists increases in the post-World War 
I, that is in the 1930 and 1938 which 
happens due to the fight for jobs in 
Rangoon (Yangon) (Kadou, 2015). 
Analyzing conflict in Myanmar is 
not an easy task, but serial historical factors 
with violence over Muslim Rohingya is 
showing that ethical conflict is not new, it 
was rooted on their historical relationship. 
Through short explanation, we can analyze 
what Buddhists’ relationship with the 
Muslim minority in Myanmar looks like. 
However, it cannot be generally concluded 
that the Buddhist-Muslim relationship in 
Myanmar is worse because, in several 
cases, anti-Muslim sentiment happens in 
Rakhine due the ethnicity of Rohingya, and 
the conflict has also happened outside 
Rakhine. 
 There are some hypotheses that 
can be drawn by looking at this problem; 
first is that conflicts happening between 
Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim Rohingya is 
motivated through economic-politic and 
social variables. Second, is that the conflict 
between the two had created bigger 
religious conflicts crossing ethnicity. It had 
happened due to fear over wide 
distribution of Muslim power and the 
possibility of a scrapped Buddhist 
position, which still needs to be proved. 
Third is that conflict over Buddhist 
Rakhine and Muslim Rohingya is 
considered completely as an ethnical 
conflict, but it has much to do with a 
religion. For the example, their rejection 
over Rohingya without mentioning Islam 
as the religious attribute. Fourth is the 
limited information of conflict regarding 
the relationship between Buddhist 
Burmese and ethnic Hui (Panthay) as 
minority. Meaning the closeness between 
Rakhine and Hui could be viewed as 
ethnical intimacy, both of which came from 
Mongoloid race. Yet, it could be also 
interpreted that the ethnic of Hui could 
adopt the local culture better compared 
with Bengali Muslim (Rohingya) and 
Indians. 
Path for Harmony 
Although it is not easy and there is 
still no win-win solution acquired between 
Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim Rohingya, 
many efforts had already been shown to 
reconcile the parties. Indeed, this issue had 
grabbed international attention, either 
from the Muslim countries or non-Muslim 
countries. International respond over the 
conflicts in Myanmar, especially in the 
northern Rakhine State is a movement for 
global humanitarian crisis. 
Since the crisis happened in the 
2012, 57 counties affiliated in the 
Organization of Islam Cooperation (OIC) 
condemned genocide over Rohingya 
Muslim in Myanmar, as what happened in 
the summit meeting in Mecca, Augusts 
2012 (Kadoe, 2015). In the other side, 
Myanmar government invited the state 
representatives and UN to see the actual 
reality that is happening in the Rakhine 
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State. Indeed, this decision also emerges a 
serial of protests especially from Buddhists 
in several areas of conflicts, such as 
Yanggon, Meiktila, Lashio in the northern 
Shan State. 
A couple years before in 2011, Adli 
Abdullah, the leader of the International 
Concern Group on Rohingya (ICGR) in 
Malaysia, hoped that the Rohingya issue 
could be discussed in the ASEAN Summit 
while several parliaments from Southeast 
Asian countries still intensively conducted 
the dialogue to solve the issue of Rohingya. 
They urge ASEAN to include this issue as 
the main agenda of the ASEAN summit in 
Malaysia on 26-27 April 2015. However, 
this effort still has an obstacle, because 
Myanmar considers the issue of Rohingya 
as a domestic matter and ASEAN has no 
right to interfere this issue. Even if there are 
many Rohingya refugees residing in 
ASEAN countries, particularly in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. 
Later, on 20th of May 2015, the 
Foreign Ministers of three ASEAN 
countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand conducts a meeting in Kuala 
Lumpur to discuss joint solutions and the 
resolving of regional issues (Indonesian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).  This 
Meeting also aims to find a comprehensive 
solution involving the country of origin, 
transit, and goals through the principle of 
burden sharing and shared responsibility. 
This is necessary to prevent the issue of 
irregular migrants for it not to evolve into 
a humanitarian crisis in Southeast Asia. 
Furthermore, in the meeting with 
the Ministry of External Affair of ASEAN 
in Yangon December 2016, the Minister 
from Malaysia, Anifah Aman, demands for 
full humanitarian access in the conflict 
area. It made Malaysia as the ASEAN 
country that initiates involvement into the 
issue. Indeed, Malaysia also reports to give 
emergency support for Rohingya Muslim 
refugees in February 2017. It is recorded 
that since the humanitarian crisis 
happened in 2012, many Rohingya 
refugees have been escaping to Southern 
Malaysia. 
Likewise, Malaysia and Indonesia 
as the largest Muslim populations in Asia 
have also been supporting the refugees in 
the same way. Recently, refugees of 
Rohingya community receives 
accommodation and hospitality in Aceh 
before they depart to Australia to gain 
asylum. Indonesia is also the only state 
allowed by the Myanmar government to 
enter the Rakhine region to provide 
humanitarian assistance to Rohingya 
refugees when the crisis still occurred. The 
Indonesian government through the 
Ministry for External Affairs has been 
doing diplomacy in resolving conflict as 
well as giving humanitarian aids for 
Rohingya Muslims. Thus, international 
demand for harmony cannot be well-
achieved without internal effort from 
Myanmar government per se. 
The wining of National League for 
Democracy (NLD), pioneered by Aung San 
Suu Kyi in the general election 2015 had 
previously seen as bringing a hope for 
religious freedom and sectarian conflict.  In 
contrary, wining does not give a significant 
contribution to religion harmony. Indeed, 
Aung San Suu Kyi intents to limit 
international intervene for resolving the 
problem of Rohingya Muslim and 
Buddhist Rakhine. Furthermore, the 
appointment of Htin Kyaw in the 
parliament (2016) gives no significant 
changes due to his loyalty towards Aung 
San Suu Kyi. Thus, the harmony is located 
on the government’s ability in handling 
militaristic regime. At least, the president 
from civil society could be a new hope for 
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Myanmar after many years of militaristic 
controlling regime. 
While, international sympathy over 
this case is still going on. In the prior 
December 2016, there are fourteen 
countries, among them are Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the 
United States. These countries imposed 
Myanmar government in allowing them to 
give aids for Rohingya Muslims (The New 
York Times, 2016). It is related to the UN 
report portraying the increasing number of 
humanitarian crisis in that area. However, 
the amount of aid especially in food is still 
limited. There are 20,000 people from 
150,000 refugees who got food. This 
tragedy was reported by Pierre Péron, a 
spokesperson of UN for Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs. 
Basically, the problem of Rohingya 
Muslim is not an easy task to be solved, it 
is due to historical complexity that has 
been happening for a long while. In other 
words, a conflict between Rohingya 
Muslim and Buddhist Rakhine is not 
merely a temporary response; it is rooted 
happened many years, across generation 
and remaining into the present. 
Conclusion 
It is believed that Rohingya is a 
legacy from British colonial policies that 
are trapped in a misfortunate situation. 
Historically, Rohingya were leaving their 
ancestors to migrate into Rakhine State 
during the British colonial period and was 
called by most non-Rohingya people as 
Bengali Muslim. The official view of the 
Myanmar Government is that all Rohingya 
people are illegal immigrants from Bengal 
(present day Bangladesh) and the 
government does not address Muslim 
migration under British rule (Gibson, 
2016). Otherwise, according to historian 
and it is mostly believed by Rohingya 
people, they argued that their ancestors 
were not only coming from East Bengal, 
but also from different Muslim countries. 
They were not coming to Rakhine State 
during the British colonial period but over 
hundred years earlier before. Rohingya 
people has heavily rooted in Rakhine, the 
definition of Rohingya people identity 
seems difficult to be explained. Hence, the 
Rohingya people itself as an ethnic identity 
is still debatable. 
The conflict in Rakhine based on 
the primordialists and constructivist 
perspectives also could be explained based 
on historical context which states that for 
centuries the Burma Kingdom did invade 
Rohingya to get Arakan. After Arakan was 
a part of Burma Kingdom, this land since 
then belongs to them. In the 17th century, 
when Arakan was under the British rule, 
Rohingya was protected until the Britain 
colony left the country in 1948. Post-British 
rule, the Muslims’ peacefulness in Arakan 
changes into conflict with the Buddhists. 
Indeed, since 1962, the junta military has 
oppressed Rohingya Muslims and played 
a significant role in the movement to expel 
Rohingya from the Myanmar state. The 
case of Rohingya currently has found a 
new stage and it is a concerned as an issue 
related to humanitarian disaster in 
Southeast Asia. This issue becomes more 
complex because the conflict involves not 
only ethnic-religious, but also economic, 
social and political aspects. However, the 
conflict between the Buddhist and 
Rohingya community is very complicated 
and its resolution is not easy. The 
international communities are continuing 
their efforts to negotiate with junta military 
to give more accesses to Rohingya and to 
know about what happened in Rakhine as 
a part of humanitarian activities. 
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